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JURISDICTION? NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a District Court judgment and order , 
granted in a divorce proceeding. This Court has jurisdiction 
over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(g) (1953), 
as amended • 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does Michael Barker enjoy a special status as a "free 
white male citizen de iure ," or any other status, such that the 
District Court did not have jurisdiction over him, or such that 
the laws of Utah do not apply to him? 
2. Is Michael Barker obligated to support his children and 
to reimburse the State if, through the AFDC program, it does so 
on his behalf? In seeking such reimbursement from Michael 
Barker, is the State entitled to discover information regarding 
his income and assets? 
3. In the proceedings below, did Michael Barker properly 
join those parties designated as "Non-Parties/Respondents" in the 
List of Parties above (page ii)? 
4. Did the District Court properly dismiss Michael 
Barker's "tort-like" claims against the Non-Parties? 
5. Was Michael Barker afforded due process of law in the 
divorce proceedings? 
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6. Was the Mexican divorce entitled to be recognized as 
valid and enforceable in Utah? 
STATUTES WHQgfi INTERPRETATION Ig DETERMINATIVE 
All of the statutes cited above have bearing in this case, 
but the following statutes are the most significant and 
determinative: 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3 (1953), as amended: 
Every man shall support his child . • . . 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-9 (1953)/ as amended: 
. . . The state department of social services 
may proceed pursuant to this act or any other 
applicable statute, either on its own behalf 
or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the 
obligee's right of support against the obligor. . . • 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3 (1953)/ as amended: 
(c) If assistance is furnished by the 
department . . . the department is the trustee 
of any cause of action or claims of the obligee 
or any minor child in that obligee's custody/ 
to recover support due to the obligee from 
any person. 
(d) The department may bring and maintain the 
action either in its own name or in the name 
of the obligee. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-2(8) (1953)/ as amended: 
"Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. 
STATEMENT QF TSE CASE 
This is an action for divorce/ filed by Laura Beth Barker 
against Michael Robert Barker. (R. 11-21). The State was named 
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as a co-plaintiff because Mrs. Barker was receiving public 
assistance for the parties' minor children/ and the State desired 
an order requiring Mr. Barker to reimburse it for that public 
assistance. (R. 16). 
Mr. Barker then filed an Answer/ and subsequent pleadings/ 
in which he named various persons and entities as additional 
parties plaintiff. (R. 22/ 24/ 37/ 38/ 39). These are the 
persons designated herein as Non-Parties/Respondents. They 
consist of the Office of Recovery Services/ various State 
officials/ Utah Legal Services/ Inc./ and various persons either 
currently or previously working for Utah Legal Services/ Inc. 
Mr. Barker added these Non-Parties to his pleadings without ever 
making a motion to join them as parties. 
At trial/ the court entertained motions by the State's 
attorney and Mrs. Barker's attorney to dismiss the action as to 
the Non-Parties/ on the grounds that the Non-Parties had never 
been properly joined as parties/ and that Mr. Barker had failed 
to state a cause of action against any of them. The court 
granted those motions/ on those grounds. (Trial Transcript/ page 
33). The court did provide Mr. Barker an opportunity to present 
evidence at trial regarding claims he said he had against the 
State Department of Social Services. (Trial Transcript/ page 
40) . 
The court then heard the evidence and arguments of the 
parties and granted the divorce. (Trial Transcript/ pages 20 9-
217). It denied Mr. Barker's claims for relief against the 
Department of Social Services. (Trial Transcript/ pages 215-
216) . 
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Mr. Barker then appealed the decision of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(Unless stated otherwise/ all references in this brief to 
the Transcript are to the Trial Transcript.) 
Facts relating to the divorce in general; The State 
incorporates herein by reference the Statement of Facts found on 
pages 8 through 12 of the brief of Mrs. Barker. 
Facts relating to the State's collection of child support 
from Mr . Barker 2 The State incorporates herein by reference 
said Statement of Facts from Mrs. Barker's brief/ and also 
submits the following additional facts. 
At the time of the trial/ Mrs. Barker had been on public 
assistance since January 1985. (Transcript/ page 63). The State 
had claims against Mr. Barker in the amount of $1/7 46.0 0 for 
reimbursement of public assistance provided for his children. 
(Transcript/ page 134). The claims of the State against Mr. 
Barker/ as raised in the Amended Complaint/ essentially consist 
of the following: (1) a claim that defendant be ordered to pay 
ongoing support for his children/ and that such payments be made 
through the Office of Recovery Services as long as Mrs. Barker 
receives public assistance for them; (2) a claim for judgment 
against Mr. Barker for reimbursement of past public assistance 
provided the children; and (3) a request for mandatory income 
withholding as provided by Utah statute. (R. 16/ 9-10)• 
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Prior to the judicial establishment of Mr* Barker's child 
support obligation by the District Court/ the State Office of 
Recovery Services had been engaged in efforts to administratively 
establish the defendant's child support obligation and to collect 
such support from him. In connection therewith, the Office of 
Recovery Services had taken steps to discover financial 
information regarding Mr. Barker. Among other things# the State 
had contacted Mr. Barker's employer to verify wage information. 
(Transcript/ pages 131-144). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This is a divorce case in which the wife has been a 
recipient of State AFDC assistance for the children. The State 
of Utah joined as a party in order to obtain appropriate 
reimbursement of such assistance from the husband. 
Prior to the commencement of the subject divorce 
proceedings/ the husband obtained a Mexican divorce. (He was not 
a resident of Mexico/ nor did he travel to Mexico to obtain the 
Mexican divorce.) The District Court properly held that the 
Mexican divorce was not entitled to be recognized in Utah. 
The husband claims a special legal status which he says 
prevents the courts of Utah from having jurisdiction over him. 
He also claims special rights because of such status/ and he 
claims that certain Utah laws do not apply to him because of such 
status. All of his claims of special status are without merit. 
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After the husband was served with the summons and complaint 
in this casef he filed pleadings purporting to join as parties 
various additional persons/ including State officials/ State 
attorneys/ and his wife's attorneys. He made certain "tort-like" 
claims against those persons. He failed to follow proper 
procedures for joining any additional parties/ nor did he 
properly state any claims against them or against the Department 
of Social Services. The trial judge properly dismissed those 
extraneous claims against those persons/ and against the 
Department of Social Services. 
The defendant was afforded due process of law in the 
proceedings before the District Court/ and his appeal should be 
dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY NOTE: Pursuant to Rule 2 4(i) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals/ the State incorporates herein by reference the 
brief of respondent Laura Barker/ in its entirety. 
I- Defendant/Appellant Michael R. Barker is subject to the 
lurisdiction of the courts of Utah, and he is also subject to the 
laws of Utah* 
Appellant Michael R. Barker claims that he enjoys a special 
status which he describes as a "free/ white sovereign citizen (de 
jure) of the State of Utah." He alleges that/ because of his 
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alleged special status, the District Court lacked jurisdiction 
over him. 
At trial/ Mr. Barker claimed that the legal authorities 
cited by the plaintiffs in arguments before the court "do not 
apply" to him# because he claims to be a "sovereign status 
person." (Transcript/ page 25). He claimed that he is de jure 
person/ and that the judge and the opposing parties are de facto 
persons. (Transcript/ page 27). He said that MrSf Barker has 
"civil rights under the 14th Amendment/" whereas h&. has 
"sovereign rights." (Transcript/ page 26). He stated that "on 
the basis of maritime equity/" he is not an "obligor/" and he 
tried to use this as a defense to the State's claims for 
reimbursement of public assistance provided for his children. 
(Transcript/ page 2 5.) 
Mr. Barker's claim that he has a special status which 
somehow excuses him from being subject to the jurisdiction of the 
District Court is wholly without merit. The Utah Supreme Court 
summarily rejected similar "special status" arguments in City of 
Salina v . Wisden. 737 P.2d 981 (Utah 1987). In that case , the 
court stated: 
In order for our scheme of ordered liberties 
to succeed/ we must all obey valid lawsf even 
those with which we do not agree; a man 
cannot exempt himself from the operation 
of a law simply by declaring that he does 
not consent to have it apply to him. 
City of Salina v. Wisden, at p. 983. 
Mr. Barker 's bel ief tha t he is a "free white sovereign c i t i z en dja. 
ju re" does not prevent the Courts of Utah/ including the Sixth 
D i s t r i c t Court/ from exercis ing ju r i sd i c t ion over him and 
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granting the orders which were rendered below. Nor does his said 
belief prevent the laws of Utah from applying to him, including 
those laws which hold him responsible for the support of his 
children. The trial court acted properly in determining that the 
defendant has no special rights# above and beyond those of any 
other citizen. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 
18) . 
!!• Defendant/Appellant Michael Barker has an obligation to 
support his children and to reimburse the State for public 
assistance provided for those children* The State is entitled to 
discover financial information pertaining to the defendant in 
connection with the establishment and enforcement of his support 
obligations* 
Utah statutes and case law make it abundantly clear that 
every man has an obligation to support his children. §7 8-45-3, 
Utah Code Annotated/ 1953/ as amended; Rees v» Archibald. 311 
P.2d 788 (Utah 1957). (All statutory citations herein are to 
Utah Code Annotated/ 1953/ as amended/ unless otherwise stated.) 
Mr. Barker is the undisputed father of the children in this case. 
Therefore/ he has a legal duty to support them. Because he has a 
duty to support these children/ he is/ by definition/ an 
"obligor" under both the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act 
(§78-45-2(2)) and the Public Support of Children Act (§78-45b-
2(8)). A parent does not have to behind in his child support 
payments to be an "obligor." As long as he has children to 
support/ he is an obligor. 
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Utah law also makes it clear that when the State* from 
public funds* provides aid to families with dependent children 
(AFDC) * the State is entitled to seek reimbursement of that aid 
from parents ("obligors") having support obligations respecting 
those children. §78-45-9; §78-45b-l.l; §78-45b-3. When a court 
order is in effect establishing the amount of the obligor's child 
support obligation* then that order governs. §78-45-7(1); §78-
45b-4; Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1977). 
When no court order is in effect (as was the case here prior 
to the entry of the orders below) the law requires that various 
circumstances be taken into consideration in determining the 
appropriate amount of reimbursement for prior periods* and 
prospective support for future periods. §78-45-7; §78-45b-6(2). 
In determining the appropriate amount of reimbursement for prior 
periods* the courts must consider/ among other things* "the 
amount of public assistance received by the obligee." §78-45-
7(3) . 
The legislature has commissioned the Office of Recovery 
Services (ORS) with the responsibility for collecting such 
reimbursement of public moneys from child support obligors. §55-
15c-4. In the fulfillment of its duties* ORS is entitled to 
discover information regarding the income and employment of 
obligors. Such information is extremely relevant to the 
determination of a child support obligation* and constitutes 
important evidence which ORS is entitled to discover. §78-45b-
3(8). 
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Appellant Michael Barker claims that the ORS violated his 
privacy when it contacted his employer to verify employment and 
to obtain wage information pertaining to him. He also states 
that one of his reasons for claiming that such contact with the 
employer was improper is that "there was no default judgment 
against Defendant. . . ." (Appellant's Brief/ page 17). He 
claims that ORSfs attempts to discover financial information 
about him did not constitute an "official investigation" under 
§78-27-50/ and that the contact with his employer was improper. 
Mr. Barker essentially seems to be saying that the Office of 
Recovery Services must/ without independent inquiry/ accept as 
truthful the representations of child support obligors regarding 
their financial situation. These contentions are without merit. 
First# the constitutional provisions cited by Mr. Barker in 
Point 5/ pages 17 to 21 of his brief/ are those which bar 
unreasonable searches and seizures/ and the deprivation of life/ 
liberty or property without due process of law. The State 
submits that the contacting of Mr. Barker's employer to obtain 
important/ relevant information was totally reasonable/ 
consistent with the Constitution and permissible under Utah 
statutes. 
Second/ as mentioned above/ ORS is entitled/ under §78-45b-
3(8)/ to gather such evidence. That section gives ORS general 
authorization to gather information in the performance of its 
duties under the Public Support of Children Act. It is not 
necessary that the inquiry be part of an official investigation. 
When the State is proceeding under §78-27-50/ which deals with 
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discovering information from financial institutions/ the statute 
makes it clear than any official investigation by ORS is exempt 
from the requirements of financial information privacy. The 
State submits that when the Office of Recovery Services/ as part 
of its statutory mandate/ is attempting to obtain relevant 
information necessary to establish and enforce child support 
obligations owed by an absent parent/ it is involved in an 
official investigation. Whichever statute ORS was proceeding 
under in this case/ its contact with Mr. Barker's employer was 
appropriate and reasonable. 
Third/ Mr. Barker's apparent claim that the State was not 
entitled to contact his employer because there was no default 
judgment against him# makes no sense. The statutes cited above 
clearly allow ORS to discover such evidence/ and there is no 
requirement that a default judgment be in place before such 
evidence may be discovered. 
Finally/ the testimony at the trial provides an excellent 
illustration of one of the main reasons why it was necessary for 
the legislature to allow ORS to discover such financial 
information about child support obligors. Waine Riches / Mrs. 
Barker's attorney/ was examining Mr. Barker regarding his 
employment and income: 
Q Are you currently employed? 
A I object to the question. It violates my 
right to privacy. 
THE COURT Your objection is overruled. 
Answer the question. 
MR. BARKER Your Honor/ I am objecting. 
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THE COURT I said your objection is 
overruled. Answer the question* 
MR. BARKER Sir, I don't want to argue. 
THE COURT Well, I don't want to put you 
in jail. I've just instructed you to answer 
the question. The question was: "Are you 
employed?" That's a very simple question. 
MR. BARKER Again, I am basing my rights 
issue on the fact that I am not a juristic 
person, that I am de iures status. 
THE COURT And I am telling you I don't care 
whether you are or you aren't a person like you 
are saying. I am saying you will answer the 
question or I'll hold you in contempt. . • . 
I don't want to argue with you. I'm just saying 
answer the question. 
MR. BARKER What was the question? 
MR. RICHES Are you presently employed? 
A Yes 
Q Where? 
A St. George Mining 
Q What is your gross pay per month? 
A Why do you want to know that information? 
THE COURT He is asking you a question. You 
answer the question. You don't ask him. 
MR. BARKER Your Honor, I think I'm going to have 
to go to jail. 
THE COURT Then you might be. . . . Will you 
please answer the question, what the gross pay is. 
A I am not sure what the gross pay is. I would 
have to look at the records. (Transcript, pages 121 
to 122) . 
The testimony continues with obvious evasions on the part of 
the witness to conceal his true income. His statements to the 
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effect that he could not say what his income was without "looking 
at his records/" are simply not credible. Obviously# relying on 
such testimony of a child support obligor# without being able to 
independently verify his incomer would hamstring the State in its 
attempts to pursue reimbursement of AFDC funds expended on behalf 
of the obligor's children. 
The State was and is entitled to look to Mr . Barker for 
reimbursement of public moneys provided for his childrent and to 
obtain independent verification of his employment and income. 
The order of the court respecting the Mr. Barker's child support 
obligations took all proper factors into consideration and was 
fair and reasonable/ and is entitled to be affirmed. 
III. The "Non-Parties/Respondents" were not properly Joined 
in this case, and the District Court acted properly in dismissing 
Appellant's claims against them. 
When a party defendant/ such as Mr. Barker/ desires to 
litigate claims of his own in the lawsuit/ he has four possible 
options. First/ if he has claims against an existing plaintiff, 
he may file a counterclaim/ following the procedures set forth in 
Rule 13/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Second/ if he has claims 
against another existing defendant, he may file a cross-claim/ 
pursuant to the same rule. (In this case/ the Mr. Barker is the 
sole defendant.) Third/ if he feels that some third party would 
be liable for the things that the plaintiff is asserting against 
him/ then he may file a third-party complaint/ following the 
procedures set forth in Rule 14/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Finally# if the defendant feels that he has some claims which 
ought to litigated in the original proceeding/ but which cannot 
be brought as a counterclaim/ cross-claim/ or third-party 
complaint/ then he must make a proper motion for joinder and 
obtain leave of court to bring the additional parties in. Rule 
21/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
These four options are the only ways a defendant can bring 
additional parties into the lawsuit. Unless he proceeds under 
one of those options he may not accomplish a joinder by simply 
typing the names of additional parties in the caption of the 
complaint and sending pleadings to them. To permit such a 
procedure would deny those additional parties the due process of 
law. 
Appellant Michael Barker never properly joined the Non-
Parties in this action/ and the record so shows. Instead/ 
without proper authority/ he added the names of numerous other 
persons—State officials/ opposing attorneys/ and so forth—that 
he felt had done things he didn't likef and raised claims against 
them as part of these divorce proceedings. 
The District Judge properly dismissed Mr. Barker's claims 
against the Non-Parties on the grounds that they were not 
properly joined. (Transcript/ page 33). 
iv. Appellant's "tort-like" claims against the "Non-
Parties/Respondents" and against the State Department of Social 
Services were properly dismissed because they were not proper to 
raise in a divorce proceeding, and because they failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted. 
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Even if appellant Michael Barker had properly joined the 
Non-Parties/ he failed to state claims against them upon which 
the District Court could grant relief, and the court properly 
dismissed his claims against them on that ground as well. The 
same applies to his claims against the Department of Social 
Services. 
First/ Mr. Barker's claims against the Non-Parties and the 
Department of Social Services were in the nature of tort claims 
and were not properly raised in these divorce proceedings. The 
State incorporporates herein by reference Point III on pages 18 
and 19 of Mrs. Barker's brief/ which covers that point. 
Second/ Mr. Barker's claims against the Non-Parties and the 
Department of Social Services arise out the activities they 
regularly and properly engage in as part of their employment/ 
which activities are not actionable/ no matter how much Mr. 
Barker doesn't like them. For example/ he claims that the State 
is involved in trying to collect child support from him. This is 
true/ but it is not actionable. To the contrary/ it is something 
which Utah law requires be done. Mr. Barker may not like it/ and 
he may think that he has a special status which exempts him from 
the application of laws that apply to society in general. But 
that does not give him a cause of action on that point. 
Another example is Mr. Barker's claim that Ross Blackham/ 
the County Attorney/ did not file criminal charges against Mrs. 
Barker as the result of an incident in which Mrs. Barker 
allegedly assaulted Mr. Barker. When Mr. Barker learned that the 
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County Attorney had decided not to charge his wife# he then asked 
the Attorney General's Office to intercede. The Attorney 
General's Office, after reviewing the matter/ decided not to 
override the discretion which the County Attorney had exercised. 
Mr. Barker complains of these things. Even if true/ however/ 
these facts do not give Mr. Barker a cause of action against any 
Non-Party or against the Department of Social Services. It is 
well established that prosecuting authorities have discretion to 
file criminal charges/ or not to file charges/ as they deem 
appropriate after reviewing the facts. State v. Hoffman, 558 
P.2d 602 (Utah 1976). The County Attorney and the Attorney 
General were in the proper fulfillment of their duties in dealing 
with Mr. Barker's criminal complaint as they did. 
The myriad other matters raised by Mr. Barker against the 
Non-Parties and the Department of Social Services are of a 
similar vein/ and they all fail to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted. The District Court acted properly in 
dismissing them. 
v. tUchael Barker ^fts afforded due process of law in the 
proceedings before the District Court, 
Mr. Barker's brief makes repeated assertions that he was 
denied due process in the trial of this matter. Those assertions 
are wholly without merit. 
In plain terms/ and with all due respect to Mr. Barker/ the 
situation is this: Mr. Barker is not trained in the law. 
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Although he has submitted voluminous paperwork to the court and 
the other parties which has contained many legal-sounding terms, 
he does not know enough about the law, and legal procedures, to 
evaluate whether or not a particular point has legal merit. He 
seems to have the idea that if he disagrees with a particular 
action, such action is wrong and violates his due process rights 
and various other rights. However, as was stated above in the 
language quoted from City of Salina v» Wisden. it is the duty of 
every person to obey the law—even those laws with which they 
disagree . 
Accordingly, the fact that Mr. Barker may not like what has 
happened in these proceedings does not render them erroneous. 
Obviously he has been frustrated in his "game plan." He has done 
every imaginable thing to avoid submitting this divorce 
proceeding to the District Court for a proper determination— 
probably because he wants to avoid the child support and other 
obligations that the court would impose. For instance, he 
obtained a Mexican divorce, which, coincidentally, does not 
require Mr. Barker to pay child support for his children. He has 
also "rescinded [his] marriage contract to eliminate a nexus 
between [himself] and the State" in an attempt to say that Utah 
laws do not apply to him. (Transcript, page 172). He apparently 
feels that because the District Court found that those steps did 
not dissolve his marriage to Mrs. Barker, the court denied him 
due process of law. 
It is appropriate to briefly treat some specific items which 
Mr. Barker apparently feels denied him due process: 
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A. Mr. Barker claims he was denied a right to trial by 
jury. It is clear that under Utah law, a divorce action is 
equitable in nature and that there is no right to a jury trial. 
24 Am Jur 2d 410, Divorce & Separation §342; §30-3-4, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953), as amended; Lord v, Shaw . 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983). 
B . Mr. Barker claims he was denied the right to counsel of 
his choice. This is incorrect. At the pretrial hearing on 
January 2, 1987, the court told Mr. Barker that he could have 
counsel of choice—but the court also made it abundantly clear 
that such counsel would have to be an attorney. (Transcript of 
Pretrial Hearing, page 5, lines 15-17, and pages 6-7). Then, at 
trial, Mr. Barker attempted to have a non-lawyer act as his 
lawyer. (Trial Transcript, pages 5-6. The judge properly 
directed such non-lawyer to take his seat behind the bar, and not 
to act as Mr. Barker's attorney. §78-51-25. 
C. Mr. Barker claims the District Court was not properly 
set. His argument on this point is not clear, but it appears he 
claims that it was a violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine for the District Court to hear the divorce case, when 
one of his theories was that he had rescinded his marriage 
license. Contrary to what Mr. Barker alleges in his brief, the 
court did allow him to explain his separation of powers argument. 
(Transcript, pages 37-38). The court simply disagreed with Mr. 
Barker, and found that it did in fact have jurisdiction in the 
case and that it was properly sitting. (Transcript, pages 3 7-
38) . It is well established that the District Courts are courts 
of general jurisdiction, and that they are authorized to hear 
-23-
divorce matters. Utah Constitutionf Article VIII, Section 5; 
§78-3-4. The fact that Mr. Barker was proceeding under the 
theory that he had "rescinded" his Utah marriage license did not 
in any way detract from the authority of the District Court to 
resolve that issue. 
D. Mr. Barker claims the court erred in threatening him 
with incarceration when he refused to answer questions about his 
finances. This was not error; a court has the power to hold a 
witness in contempt for failing to answer lawful questions (which 
these were) after being ordered to do so, and to incarcerate the 
witness in connection with that contempt. §78-32-1; §78-32-3; 
§78-32-10. 
E. Mr. Barker claims the court erred in denying him the 
right to ask certain questions of witnesses. Any limitations 
placed on the scope of Mr. Barker's questions or testimony were 
essentially on grounds of irrelevancy. For example/ Mr. Barker 
tried to ask the County Attorney why he did not file criminal 
charges against Mrs. Barker for assault and battery. That 
question was objected to on grounds of irrelevancy/ and the 
objection was sustained/ and properly sof since the question of 
the County Attorney's handling of Mr. Barker's assault and 
battery claim was not in issue and had nothing to do with the 
divorce proceedings pending before the court. (Transcript/ page 
157) . A litigant is not entitled to use the courts as a forum to 
ask questions of parties which are irrelevant to the matters at 
hand/ and it is not a denial of due process for the court to so 
order. 
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F. Mr* Barker claims the court erred in "giving him legal 
advice." All the judge did was recommend that Mr. Barker retain 
an attorney to represent him. This was good advice and there was 
nothing wrong with the judge giving it. 
G. Mr. Barker claims the court was a party to a conspiracy 
because it failed to accept his claims that he, Mr. Barker, was 
the victim of a conspiracy. Such a claim is an affront to the 
court/ and is totally ridiculous. It is well established that a 
trial judge is responsible for weighing the evidence presented at 
trial/ and assigning such weight to different items of evidence 
as he deems appropriate/ taking into consideration such things as 
the credibility of witnesses. The court was not obliged to 
accept Mr. Barker's claims of conspiracy and/ by not accepting 
those claims/ did not become a party to a conspiracy. 
vi. The court properly ruled that the Mexican Divorce w»§ 
not entitled to be recognised as valid and enforceable in Utah* 
The State incorporates herein the arguments in Mrs. Barker's 
brief which deal with this issue. It also points out that the 
court did receive evidence that neither Mr. or Mrs. Barker had 
been to Mexico during the five years preceding the trial. 
(Transcript/ page 104). The court properly found that the 
Mexican divorce should not be recognized in Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
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The State respectfully asks that appellant Michael Barker's 
appeal be dismissed in its entirety and that he take nothing 
thereby. 
Pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals^ the State also asks for an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees and double costs against Michael Barker. This 
appeal, at least with regard to those issues involving the State, 
is totally frivolous. 
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